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Abstract: The interplay between use of force in conflicts and involved parties’ rhetorical efforts to 
determine related international discourse has long been subject of research and debate. However, 
how and why states adopt digital media in conflict, as well as how the emerging opportunity for 
“Digital Diplomacy” influences their actual communication warrants further consideration. This 
question raised in public, media and academia during Israel’s eight-day operation “Pillar of De-
fense” in Gaza in November 2012, when the military confrontation between Israel and Hamas was 
mirrored in a clash on social media as additional battlefield. The presented analysis of Israel’s 
online performance bases on Ben Mor’s self-presentation framework (2007, 2012), which explains 
constraints for structure and substance of communication by which states seek to build, maintain 
or defend their image in home and foreign audiences. Relevant Israeli Twitter feeds are analyzed 
and results flanked by semi-structured interviews with Israeli communication officials.  
Accordingly, Israel more than other political actors engages in proactive Digital Diplomacy, expect-
ing benefits of directly reaching crucial publics and providing an alternative story, while accepting a 
certain loss of control. The constant communication aims at explaining and thus “humanizing” Is-
rael’s militarized image in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, with a focus on hard-power 
messages (threat scenarios, delegitimization, in-group/ out-group thinking, military instead of po-
litical successes) and the absence of political solutions, it is unlikely to convey a peace-oriented im-
age or even – taking a longer view – to prepare the ground for a political solution. 
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Introduction 
 
“The IDF has begun a widespread campaign on terror sites & operatives in the 
#Gaza Strip, chief among them #Hamas & Islamic Jihad targets” 
(IDF_spokesperson, 2012). Sent by the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) official Twit-
ter account on November 14, 2012, it was the first ever tweeted declaration of war. 
Soon after, the first bombs hit Gaza. In the ensuing armed conflict and the Israeli 
Operation Pillar of Defense, the hostilities between Israel and Hamas found a new 
battlefield: social media. Both the IDF and Hamas’ armed wing, the al-Qassam 
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Brigades1, kept up dueling live Twitter feeds, each constantly informing on rocket 
attacks, casualty numbers as well as giving their perspective on the conflict.  
 
Due to the mediatisation of conflict in a transforming global media landscape, the 
prime strategic objective is not solely military success, but also the (re)shaping of 
public opinion (i.e. Der Derian, 2002; McInnes, 2002). Public Diplomacy (PD) 
aims to inform foreign publics of a state’s intentions in order to gain their – and 
finally their governments’ – support (Zaharna, 2004, p.5). It is, next to military 
force and traditional diplomacy subordinated to a grand strategy (Liddel Hart, 
1967), which coordinates these three components towards more fundamental po-
litical goals. One of the key driving forces that makes PD ever more important has 
been its digitalization: the instantaneous reporting of events has led to an in-
creased visibility of war which amplifies the need for explanation (Mor, 2006, 
p.162; Sheafer & Shenhav, 2009, p.272). While the interplay between the use of 
force and mediated PD has been subject to research, the question how the emerg-
ing opportunity for ‘Digital Diplomacy’ (DD) is changing grand-strategic thinking 
still warrants further consideration. This is the broad research agenda that informs 
this study.  
The Israeli case provides an opportunity to study this transformation: Israel has 
been criticized by its own media and academia for not putting enough emphasis on 
proactive communication (i.e. Sheafer & Shenhav, 2009; Gilboa, 2008). Failing to 
legitimize its actions especially in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israel has main-
tained a militarized image. To what extent this shortcoming is tackled via digital 
media, is the immediate interest. This question is addressed first at the theoretical 
level, by resorting to the social psychological theory of self-presentation, and then 
empirically examined in an analysis of Israel’s actual communication on Twitter 
during the Operation Pillar of Defense, contextualized with subsequent expert in-
terviews.  
 
 
Public diplomacy as strategic communication: A view from self-
presentation theory 
 
A state’s grand strategy – as Liddel Hart already stated in 1967 – aims “to co-
ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, toward the at-
tainment of a goal defined by fundamental policy’” (p.335). Resources can be hard 
power such as coercion (military threat) and payments (economic sanction) and/or 
soft power (attractiveness, moral authority) (Nye, 2004, p.40ff), with the grand-
strategic challenge to combine them. According to Mor (2006), grand strategy thus 
requires the “integration and application of three fundamental components: force, 
diplomacy, and communication” (p.161). The latter lies at the core of Public Di-
plomacy (PD) which is defined as “a government’s process of communicating with 
                                                 
1 Hamas Twitter account (@alqassamBrigade) was suspended by Twitter in January 2014, when 
users suggested that the online platform's rules were broken, which prohibit hate speech and 
harassment (haaretz.com, 14.Jan. 2014, Twitter suspends account of Hamas military wing). 
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foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas 
and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current pol-
icies” (Tuch, 1990, p.3). It is especially crucial in conflicts when observable hard 
power is likely to hold attention (Mor, 2009, p.219; Dimitriu, 2012, p.196): public 
perception is then “greatly shaped by the narratives that governments construct 
and communicate in order to convey a sense of cause, purpose and mission” (Di-
mitriu, 2012, p.219). Implemented seriously, PD does not aim to win “hearts and 
the minds” as an end in itself but to create a basis for collaboration for achieving 
not only military victory but winning peace (Liddel Hart, 1967, p.362).  
 
Despite the growing importance of PD in peace and war, and the wide acceptance 
of strategic communication as its conceptual core (i.e. Cull, 2008; Gilboa, 2008; 
Gregory, 2005; Mor, 2006; Seib, 2009; Rasmussen & Merkelsen, 2012), research 
on communication content and the underlying intentions – hence on the question 
what governments say when they publicly communicate, and why – has been rare. 
This is addressed here with a focus on strategic communication2 in conflicts, using 
Ben Mor’s definition as self-presentation “by which states, like individuals, try to 
affect the attributions that significant others (in this case: foreign publics) make 
with respect to their identity” (Mor, 2009, p.220), thereby forming public images3. 
Self-presentation follows a strategic logic: the motivation to influence images 
(communication goal) and the corresponding behavior (different self-presentation 
strategies), are a result of the communicators’ ability to anticipate the relationship 
between what they choose to say and the effect on public opinion (ibid., p.226).  
 
Self-presentation strategies and tactics in image-threatening or im-
age-enhancing situations 
 
Mor maps out why actors engage in communicative image-management as well as 
how they actively deploy complex rhetorical strategies to impede image attacks, so-
called image predicaments. Based on an originally socio-political framework, he 
explains rhetorical reactions in (a) image-threatening situations when an actor’s 
public image is under threat of being held responsible for negative actions and/or 
outcomes and is therefore blamed. The framework also responds to (b) image-
enhancing situations when the credit for positive actions and/or outcomes is ig-
nored or under threat of denial.  
Mor further breaks down self-presentation strategies to lower-level arguments, 
which can be conceptualized as tactics. Self-presentation tactics challenge or ac-
cept so-called “blame components”: the attribution of responsibility as well as the 
(negative or positive) perception of actions or outcomes (Tedeschi & Riess, 1981, 
                                                 
2 This definition avoids playing "the merely semantic game" (Kunczik, 2009, p.770), meaning to 
respond to and distinguish the variety of expressions used by scholars which are closely related or 
essentially mean the same as "strategic communication" - such as "soft power" (Nye, 2004), 
"engagement" (Gregory, 2011), "persuasion", "advocacy" (Deibel & Roberts, 1976) or "propaganda 
wars" (Mor, 2009; Zaharna, 2004). 
3 Mor uses "identity" and "image" inconsistently and synonymously. This paper is concerned with 
the attribution that audiences make with respect to state actors – defined as public images – and 
only uses that term. 
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p.5ff; Mor, 2009). Actors hence may question their responsibility or may mini-
mize/maximize the perceived negativity/positivity of an action (act or policy) as 
well as of outcomes (consequences) for which being held responsible.  
 
Table 1: Strategies & tactics in an image-threatening and -enhancing predic-
aments 
Situation Strategy Tactic 
Typical 
statement 
Blame component addressed: 
Responsibility    Action          Outcome 
Image-
threatening  
Self-triggered: 
Image Protection 
Predicament 
 
Blame 
Avoidance 
 
Denial 
"It did not hap-
pen"  Challenge Challenge Challenge 
Dissociation "It wasn't us" Challenge Accept Accept
Excuses (non-
dispositional 
attribution) 
"We had no 
choice"; "they 
left us no 
alternative" 'we 
did not intend 
X'; 'we did not 
foresee X' 
Challenge Challenge Accept 
Reframing 
"It was 
different"; "it 
wasn't so bad" 
"others have 
done worse" 
Accept 
Accept/ 
Challenge  
Challenge / 
Accept 
Justification 
"It was 
legitimate"; "we 
played fair"; "we 
meant well" 
Accept Challenge Accept 
Regret, concessions, 
apologies  
"We're sorry"; 
"forgive us" 
Challenge 
/Accept 
Accept Accept 
 
Opponent-
triggered: 
Image Enhancing 
Opportunity 
Blame 
Imposition 
 
Association 
 
"They are re-
sponsible"; "they 
were the ones 
who initiated 
action X"; "they 
had a choice" 
Challenge Accept Accept 
Delegitimization 
"Their actions 
were not 
legitimate" 
Accept Challenge  Accept 
Offensive reframing 
"it was different 
[bad, negative]"; 
"it was worse" 
Accept Accept 
Challenge 
(maximize) 
Image-enhancing 
 
Self-triggered: 
Image Protection 
Predicament 
 
Credit Gain 
Entitlements 
"We were re-
sponsible"; "it 
was our policy 
that brought 
such results" 
Challenge  
(gain or 
maximize) 
Accept Accept 
Enhancements 
"We paid a high 
cost for doing 
X"; "We (or our 
policy) managed 
to achieve X"; 
Accept 
Challenge 
(maximize) 
Challenge  
(maximize) 
Opponent-
triggered: 
Opportunity for 
image protection 
Credit  
Denial 
Offensive 
dissociation 
"It's nothing 
they did" 
Challenge 
(deny) 
Accept Accept 
Offensive reframing 
"It would have 
happened 
anyhow"; "it 
wasn't such an 
achievement"; 
"it was different" 
Accept Challenge (deny) 
Challenge  
(deny) 
Mor, 2007; own rearrangement. 
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In order to grasp the competitive and interactive character of strategic communi-
cation when several actors are dueling with alternative explanations for own and 
other’s behavior, Mor (2007) broadened the concept as “competitive self-
presentation”. Competitive self-presentation also consists of strategies that focus 
on the opponent’s responsibility, action, or outcome. Within that setting, each ac-
tor has partial control over the other’s image. If one of the actors is successful with 
a negative campaign, the other actor is forced into defense, trying to protect its im-
age against further deterioration (ibid., p.668f). An image-threatening situation for 
the adversary equals an opportunity for own image enhancement. Table 1 shows a 
matrix of strategies and tactics for both image-threatening and image-enhancing 
situations, which provides a framework for empirical analysis.  
 
Strategies and tactics of self-validation 
 
A precondition for self-presentation’s effectiveness is to support claims with evi-
dence, to intertwine self-presentation arguments with self-validation arguments 
(Mor, 2012, p.395). Credibility talk is urgent when unexpected behavior creates 
irritation and demands for explanation (ibid. p.402ff), for example when actors 
behave inconsistently as “credibility is diminished when words and actions do not 
match” (Gregory, 2005, p.17).  
Especially in conflict situations, claims about motivations are questioned by the 
public or the adversary, with politics turning into a contest of competitive credibil-
ity.  
Credibility talk then can either mean direct crediting own claims by introducing 
new factual material or physical evidence (such as photos, video clips, leaflets). If 
an actor pursues indirect crediting, he either presents arguments on the reliability 
of evidence presented or on the reliability of interpretation by referring to credibly 
third parties sharing or endorsing the presented interpretation. Another indirect 
crediting strategy is to project character credibility through the provision of com-
mon indicators of sincerity or integrity.  
Strategies of discrediting the opponent’s accounts have the same objective and are 
even more prevalent in actual rhetoric. They follow either a direct argumentation 
that opponent claims are inconsistent or unsupported by evidence; or actors de-
ploy an indirect argumentation by presenting facts that undermine the opponent’s 
accounts or its self-proclaimed motivation.  
 
 
Digital diplomacy: New affordances for self-presentation 
 
Considering that “channels through which nations communicate with their publics 
are almost as important as the messages themselves” (Uysal, Schroeder & Taylor, 
2012, p.339), digitalization has changed these contests of self-presentation and 
self-validation. It has “devolved state influence over its national image while simul-
taneously offering new tools for the practice of public diplomacy” (Arsenault, 
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2009, p.136). Digitalization thus affords the practice of “Digital Diplomacy”4 (DD) 
as self-presentation on digital media or by using digital tools (specific services i.e. 
Facebook, Twitter). Digital media provide a channel for self-presentation that al-
lows direct, unfiltered information subsidies as a method for a consistent image-
building. It also affords social interaction and a two-way communication that 
characterizes DD as dialogue-oriented while traditional diplomacy often inherited 
a monologue-character (Kampf, Segev & Manor, 2015). 
 
The relevance of digital media as an additional communication channel in conflicts 
is related to the assumed impact of traditional media: the way media accepts and 
frames chosen self-presentation strategies has the decisive effect on the public’s 
support for war and peace. The expected causal chain leads from media news cov-
erage to public attitudes, again to government policy, and finally contributes to the 
(de-)escalation of conflict (Wolfsfeld, 2004, p.75). The rise of digital media, as 
Kaempf argues, results in “a massive broadening and diversification of the number 
of actors who can produce media and utilize media platforms” (2013, p.599). Im-
age predicaments are likely becoming intensified not only due to the plentitude of 
detractors but also due to the rapidity in which they reach global audiences – 
which intensifies the need for immediate competitive self-presentation. 
 
On the other hand, digital media affords new ways to prepare for and deal with im-
age predicament situations. In the conflict fermenting and conflict receding phas-
es, Zhang (2013, p.1325) sees their power especially as tactical tools related to dai-
ly, routine and small-scale actions. They are helpful in identifying new predica-
ments, to decide about action, to proactively and reactively communicate and after 
closing an issue, to continue communication in order to build relationships.  
Furthermore, even though the number of critical voices potentially increases, offi-
cial communication via these channels is perceived as relatively trustworthy – even 
more than via traditional media (Johnson & Kaye, 2000, 2004, 2010) – and may 
foster character-credibility of states. This, however, does not obscure the im-
portance of self-validation with accurate, credible, and stringently ethical messages 
(Arsenault, 2009, p.141) once you have gathered attention.  
 
Research so far has shown a general disconnection between digital media’s as-
sumed potential for interactive communication, and how it is utilized by political 
actors in general (Jackson & Lilleker, 2009; Peterson, 2012) and by governments 
in particular (Uysal et al., 2012; Kampf et al., 2015). Kampf et al. (2015) showed – 
based on cross-national comparison of social media content by eleven foreign min-
istries – that engagement is limited to specific issues and dialogic communication 
is rare. Content represents a continuous supply of press releases targeting foreign, 
rather than domestic, publics. Druckman, Kifer and Parkin (2007, p. 428) trace 
                                                 
4 Government officials, journalists and academia refer to new PD practices on digital media in 
various terms, i.e. e-diplomacy (Lee, 2009; BBC News, 2012), Digital Diplomacy (Zhang, 2012; The 
economist, 2012), Public Relations 2.0, Diplomacy 2.0 (Hayden, 2012; Arsenault, 2009), cyber 
diplomacy (Gilboa, 2008), web-based public diplomacy, the creation of "e-images" (Gilboa, 2008) 
or Twiplomacy (Sandre, 2012). 
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that to a dilemma which all political actors face: the tradeoff between (infor-
mation) control and flexibility. While appropriation of technical affordances seems 
to not greatly vary cross-nationally, self-presentation strategies as message content 
are “likely to show variability according to the different interactional contexts they 
are constructed to serve” (Edwards & Potter, 1992, p.28). Thus a specific context 
(Israeli-Palestinian conflict), and specific actor (Israel) are selected to be analyzed 
in order to understand the motivations for and suspicions towards DD as well as 
the resulting message content.  
 
 
The Israeli experience of self-presentation 
 
Israel faces recurring public criticism for its policy decisions, military actions, and 
is more than most countries challenged to pursue self-presentation. This is firstly 
due to the consistency of Israel’s involvement in the conflict over the creation of a 
sovereign Palestinian state – a conflict between the Palestinian National Authority 
(PNA) and the Israeli government, which has existed since the formation of Israel 
in 1948. The regular outbreaks of violent conflict in particular require explanation 
for the use of military force.  
Secondly, the conflict attracts a significant amount of media and thus international 
attention (Shenhav, Sheafer, & Gabay, 2010, S. 146). The persistent medialization 
emphasizes the need for persistent self-presentation to account for omnipresent 
actions – especially since all parties strive to achieve favorable media coverage as a 
prerequisite for political influence (ibid.).  
Thirdly, Israel as a democratic state is not only legally bound to international law 
but also expected “to implicate the legitimacy of its fight against its adversaries” 
(Kedar & Mansdorf, 2008, p.40). This complicates due to the asymmetry of con-
flict: it is not an interstate conflict but carried out between Israel as a state and a 
variety of political groups in the Palestinian Territories and the Arab neighboring 
countries. The governing authority in the Palestinian Territories is a recently uni-
fied interim government of the secular Fatah party and the Hamas, an elected Is-
lamic-fundamentalist group. Hamas has conducted many anti-Israel attacks in 
both Israel and the Palestinian territories since the 1990s – reason for being classi-
fied as terrorists by the United States, Germany, and other Western powers. Israel 
as well as other Western powers has struggled with how to interact with these 
groups as they are partly elected but also partly classified as terrorist. Plus, Israel’s 
military superiority is an undeniable fact, which leaves room for anti-Israeli criti-
cism (ibid., p.38).  
 
This complexity of legality of, legitimacy of and capacity for the use of force ampli-
fies the need for explanation, which has in fact been long noticed by politicians and 
scholars (Shenhav et al., 2010). Already in 1982, the Knesset, the Israeli Parlia-
ment, adopted the Hebrew term for “explanation” – Hasbara – not only as a key-
word within the political discourse but also a key concept in Israel’s international 
relations. Despite conceptual differences, Shenhav et al. (2010, p. 145) suggested 
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considering Hasbara as the Israeli implementation in the larger field of PD5.  
Criticism of lacking strategic Hasbara is as old as the concept. PD as a grand-
strategic approach takes public opinion and mediated environment into considera-
tion as part of policymaking, integrating long-term media relations. Hasbara, on 
the other hand, “assumes a tactical, rather than a strategic approach aiming to ex-
plain actions and policy” (ibid., p.147), which tends to result in “limited, defensive 
and apologetic” messages (Gilboa, 2008, p.735). 
  
One branch of research argues that this constant backdrop is the cause for Israel’s 
bad international image, described as the “Hasbara problem” (Greenfield, 2012). 
Messages by Israeli authorities were identified as reactive, uncoordinated and in-
appropriate to draw a consistent big picture (Shenhav et al., 2010, p.158). While 
focusing on current news management, Israel “failed to prepare for, and to deal 
with, Arab and Palestinian propaganda” (State Comptroller, 2001/2002 [Hebrew]; 
as cited in Gilboa, 2008, p.727). By denying access for journalists to control infor-
mation flow instead of proactive media management, Israel seemed to move away 
from democratic standards (Banham, 2013).  
Israel also has missed the chance to build a positive image during the few periods 
of constructive negotiations (Gilboa, 2008, p.715), being unaware that also “good 
policy, such as a peace initiative, needs (...) PD to convince others that it is useful 
and good” (ibid., p.736). As political context and goals were hardly clearly commu-
nicated, the “Gordian knot between the Israeli presence in international media and 
the harsh context of military violence (...) becomes even more difficult to untie” as 
Shenhav et al. (2010, p. 157f.) argues. The reasons for the Hasbara problem were 
attributed to a lack of coherent communication strategies, a lack of coordination 
among the ministries involved, and to inadequate funding (Gilboa, 2006, p.715, 
based on the State Comptroller reports).  
 
Other scholars argue that there has recently been a massive growth in Hasbara, in-
dicated by the increase in funding for it and by its professionalized and centralized 
character (Aouragh, 2016; Greenfield, 2012). In fact, in 2007, the national Hasbara 
headquarter was established in the Prime Minister’s Office from where so-called 
Hasbara authorities are to follow a reliable, uniform and consistent Hasbara policy 
(Greenfield, 2012, p.28). Especially DD seemed to be expanded in crisis situations: 
instead of inconsistent messaging and access control, dynamic media management 
was now pre-planned and carried out in a “situation room”, mainly by young sol-
diers. While Gilboa still criticized a weak “cyber PD” in 2008 (p.74), a “new media 
strategy” aimed to round-the-clock undermine anti-Israel agenda online (Green-
field, 2012, p.35). And yet, this second school of thought argues that despite those 
efforts, Israel’s image as well as its international relations has not noticeably 
changed. They blame not the communication but the actual policies leading to Is-
rael’s image as a “colonial power engaged in violent occupation” (Aouragh, 2016). 
Aouragh (2016) even sees Hasbara online as damaging for Israel’s image as self-
                                                 
5 The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also adopted PD as more universal translation for 
Hasbara (Shenhav et al., 2010, p. 145) 
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presentation would seem obviously contradictory to Israel-critical online journal-
ism and suppression of solidarity for Palestine would be exposed. All this would 
trigger criticism, with public support diminishing.  
In short: theory and research on Hasbara seems as controversial as the conflict sit-
uation itself. Perspectives range from considering Hasbara as the main problem for 
Israel’s image while disregarding the impact of problematic political actions, to 
seeing Israeli DD as sophisticated and beneficial for image-improving, to portray-
ing digital media as the public space where Israel’s colonialist behavior and sup-
pression would be revealed – no matter how well-thought through self-
presentation ever would be. While the internal restructuring and the emphasis on 
the use of digital media – especially in acute war situations – is a fact, there is no 
research yet on the actual impact of Israel’s DD, no evaluation of its effect on im-
age-making, to support any of those arguments. 
 
 
Research questions 
 
Before, however, measuring impact, actual performance on digital media needs to 
be mapped and contextualized first – which is likewise a lacuna in research. Mor’s 
self-presentation framework, which explains constraints for structure and sub-
stance of communication by which states seek to build, maintain or defend their 
image, will be applied here for that purpose. While Mor himself spot-checked the 
framework through plausibility probes (2009, 2012), a more comprehensive analy-
sis aims to answer the research question (RQ) What strategies of image projection 
does Israel employ on digital media? 
 
This research question comprises three sub-questions: Against the background of 
Israel’s difficulties to frame coherent alternative explanations, rarely responding to 
(opponent-triggered) image-threatening situations, the first sub-question is: (SQ 1) 
What strategies does Israel employ in image-threatening situations on digital 
media? In order to evaluate to which extent Israel unties the “Gordion Knot” be-
tween international presence in the context of military violence, the second sub-
question follows as: (SQ 2) What strategies does Israel employ in image-
enhancing situations on digital media? Thirdly, the effectiveness of chosen self-
presentation strategies depends on how communicators support claims they make 
with respect to responsibility, actions and outcomes - which leads to the sub-
question (SQ 3) How does Israel credit its messages? 
 
 
Methodology and research design 
 
The research questions were addressed with a mixed methods design of both quan-
titative and qualitative analysis of Twitter messages (Tweets), combined with ex-
pert interviews with Israeli Hasbara actors.  
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Twitter is considered as a relevant tool for DD since it is (a) a direct thematic-
informational self-presentation channel, especially important in conflict when oth-
er media sources lag behind (Howard, 2011; Verweij, 2012; Papacharissi & Oli-
viera, 2012), and (b) it presents access to a wide network in which governments 
can engage with the public as well as with opinion leaders such as journalists, poli-
ticians, bloggers (Larsson & Moe, 2012, p.741f.; Verweij, 2012, p.683). Twitter was 
also attracting more attention than any other factor in the media campaign accom-
panying the operation Pillar of Defense (Hadari & Turgeman, 2016, p.400). The 
derivate version of a weblog allows its users to send status updates from their ac-
count – tweets – with up to 140 characters each, which present here text units for 
analysis. 
 
Content analysis 
 
A content analysis as “a research technique for making replicable and valid infer-
ences from texts (...) to the contexts of their use” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 18) struc-
tured the actual implementation to make inferences to the political context. The 
illustration of quantitative results by selected tweets guaranteed contextualization 
(qualitative advantage) without diminishing the explicitness and objectivity of sci-
entific data processing (quantitative advantage) (Krippendorff, 2013, p.89f.).  
Two accounts of Hasbara actors were chosen for their range of coverage, their offi-
cial PD mandate in times of conflict and English as operating language: the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs’ account (@IsraelMFA) and the IDF spokesperson’s account 
(@IDFspokesperson). An analysis was conducted on the totality of the tweets over 
the sample period of the 8-day Operation Pillar of Defense (14-21 December 2012: 
269 tweets by @MFA_Israel; 351 tweets by @IDF_spokesperson adding up to 
N=620 tweets).  
The Twitter analytics tool “twitonomy” (twitonomy.com, 2014) facilitated data col-
lection as it allows retrieving tweets according to selected criteria. The sample ma-
terial was downloaded on 10 January 2014. It was examined by using a coding pro-
tocol which included verbal definitions of variables based on theory, former plau-
sibility probes (Mor, 2007, 2009, 2012), and test coding. Analysis focused on mes-
sage text in order to detect strategies and tactics of image projection. A test of in-
tracoder reliability, using Holsti-coefficient (Holsti, 1969), proved an acceptable 
reliability standard (100 percent for formalities; 88.3 percent for strategies and 
tactics).  
 
Expert interviews 
 
In order to prevent theory ending up in a catalogue of strategies and tactics, the 
second step reflects actual implementation against motivation for DD. Therefore, 
semi-structured expert interviews with official IDF and MFA representatives were 
conducted (June 11 & 12 2013, Tel Aviv & Jerusalem). Yoram Morad (Director, 
MFA’s Department of Digital Diplomacy), Paul Hirschson (Deputy Spokesperson, 
MFA), Allison Rubin (MFA Public Diplomacy Office) and Sacha Dratwa (Head of 
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New Media Desk, IDF Spokesperson’s Unit) were chosen as representatives of the 
so-called “functional elite” (Meuser & Nagel, 2002, p.75). Since their expert 
knowledge has the potential to become hegemonic in an organizational and func-
tional context (Bogner & Menz, 2002, p.85), their statements implicate DD strate-
gies and goals, as well as their relevance next to military and political goals. The 
interview guideline consisted of 22 open questions, sub-questions and exemplary 
alternatives on (I) Hasbara in general and the participant’s function, (II) their per-
ception of DD, (III) the relevance of Twitter as a DD tool, (IV) Operation Pillar of 
Defense as an example for DD in conflict situation. The interviews were tran-
scribed while engaging in some grammatical editing and directly confronted6 with 
actual content/ tweets. 
 
 
Findings: Strategies and tactics of image projection 
 
Quantitative analysis showed that self- and other-presentation encompassed a sig-
nificant portion of strategic communication (84% of tweets encompassed at least 
one strategy; in 37% even two). Experts explained these results with Israel’s early 
awareness for DD as the Israeli MFA was the first foreign ministry ever to set up a 
website (YM_87f); and the “need which is stronger than in other places” (YM_87f) 
to bypass traditional gatekeepers and to be directly where the audience is 
(YM_79). This need is firstly related to a perceived bias against Israel in traditional 
conflict coverage and secondly to respond to Israel’s complex social setting. “For-
eign public” means on the one hand the Jewish Diaspora in order to mobilize them 
as so called “citizens diplomats” (YM_390). But it also proved to be “the only way 
in” (PH_YM_264) to Iran and the “Arab world”, which raised hopes to break 
through walls of censorship to create a dialogue with Arab foreign publics 
(YM_279).  
The MFA’s prime communication goal seemed proactive image broadening, to 
open up the “relatively narrow prism of the conflict and political situation” 
(YM_96f) as a preparation for image predicaments: 
 
“We try to cultivate our audience, to make it bigger (...) and to keep them interested in what 
we have to tell about Israel. Also, because we know, that when a crisis comes, we have to 
have our audience ready in a way that they see Israel in a broader context” (ibid.). 
 
The IDF with its military information monopoly on the other hand, primarily con-
siders Twitter as a tool to respond to predicaments in order to maintain credibility: 
“People are listening to your bombs and you need to respond to the bombs” 
(SD_183f).  
Digital media is not seen as a platform for banalities but “(...) to defend Israel, not 
                                                 
6 Quotes are cited with the abbreviation of the name (YM= Yoram Morad; AR= Allison Rubin; SD= 
Sacha Dratwa; PH= Paul Hirschson) in conjunction with the line number in the interview 
transcripts (i.e. SD_162). Hirschson participated in two interviews. He is quoted in conjunction 
with his interview partner, and the line number (i.e. PH_AR_87). Tweets are cited as handle name 
in conjunction with the tweet number (i.e. MFA_25 or IDF_276). 
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only on the actual battle field but also on this new field” (SD_286f). The perceived 
chances afforded by digital media seemed to correlate with the acceptance of po-
tential mistakes. Due to the empowerment of diplomats and reduced centralized 
control, problematic content was expected – “mistakes have to happen” (YM_182f) 
– and seen as incitement to understand DD’s conditions better:  
 
“But when we ask ourselves - what should we do? Should we limit the activity and freedom 
of people and thus not using the advantages of these platforms the way we can - or should 
we instead develop the expertise how to deal with these prices we have to pay?” (YM_193f) 
 
A range of Israel-specific self-presentation patterns was identified, in most cases 
intertwined with self-validation claims. This underlines the used framework’s con-
struct validity. The Israeli specific strategies and tactics presented in Table 2 are 
specified in the following.  
 
Table 2: Israel-specific self-presentation and -validation tactics 
Situation Strategy Tactic Function Self-Validation 
Tactic 
Image- 
protecting 
Blame 
Imposition 
Association: Hamas & 
"Gaza"  
Simplifying complex 
actor constellation; 
balancing asymmetry 
(Israel not the aggressor) 
Facts of association; 
support by third 
actors 
Delegitimization: Acts of 
terrorism  
Simplifying moral status 
quo; creating acceptance 
for counterterrorism  
Invoking Western 
norm:  
Delegitimization: Hamas’
Double War Crime 
Simplifying moral status 
quo; creating acceptance 
for counterterrorism 
Support by third 
actors; invoking 
global norm 
(LOAC) 
Offensive reframing: Use 
Fajr-5 missiles 
Technological 
differentiation; 
balancing asymmetry 
(challenging military 
inferiority) 
Factual claims 
about Fajr-5 
Missiles 
Blame 
Avoidance 
Reframing: Objectification Balancing asymmetry 
(challenging abuse of 
military superiority); 
emphasizing 
proportionality of force 
Factual claims 
about Iron Dome; 
on-site data 
collection 
(Offensive) Reframing: 
Israel under fire 
Counterbalancing 
aggressor image; 
proportionality of force; 
creation of threat 
scenario 
Factual Claims: 
Update on rocket 
numbers; 
personalization 
Justification: Right to self-
defense 
Counterbalancing 
aggressor image;  
Invoking global 
norm  
Image- 
Enhancing 
Credit Gain Entitlement/enhancement: 
Humanitarian aid 
Softening image, 
showing "human face" 
Invoking global 
norm (LOAC); 
change in policy 
supports character-
credibility  
Entitlement: Military 
success 
Raising Moral, 
intimidating opponent 
Factual claims: 
updates on targeted 
infrastructure 
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Strategies and tactics in image-threatening situations 
 
Messages showed a heavy dose of blame imposition on groups that are widely 
acknowledged as terror organizations (61%), and related tactics such as association 
(15%), delegitimization (19%), and offensive reframing (27%) as expected after 
Mor’s plausibility probes (Mor, 2009, p.237). Blame avoidance strategies were 
used in a smaller portion (19%), predominantly reframing (9%) and justification 
tactics (9%). Responsibility for actions was hardly challenged but competence for 
the use of military force mostly assigned to the IDF as the military organ (39%).  
 
(i) Association & Delegitimization: “Hamas and other terrorists in Gaza”  
The first two tactics functioned as simplification and interpretation of the status 
quo: responsibility was solely associated with Hamas or other terroristic groups 
(MFA: 27%; IDF: 39%) – or to “Gaza” as a ‘quasi-actor’ (MFA: 13%; IDF: 29%; e.g. 
“Iron Dome system successfully intercepted 28 rockets fired from #Gaza at major 
Israeli population centers” IDF_310. This reduced the complexity of the conflict 
by leaving out moderate political parties and civil society.  
 
This tactic required a parallel evaluation of associated actions. The Hasbara au-
thorities aimed to clarify Hamas’ ambiguous moral and legal status as well as to 
elucidate their use of force by choosing strategies of delegitimization such as:  
• directly framing Hamas as terrorists (“Hamas = Terror: Terror must be 
stopped, Hamas must be stopped! […] #IsraelUnderFire”; MFA_216) and 
• indirectly framing Hamas as terrorists by neglecting the alternative interpreta-
tion of Hamas as a legitimate political party (“Think #Hamas is just a political 
party? Think again. […] #Gaza”; IDF_505).  
Hamas’ ideology and resulting actions were delegitimized by describing it as “glob-
al jihad” (e.g. MFA_203). This tactic emphasized the intentionality of Hamas’ at-
tacks on Israel’s citizens, assigned the reason for the conflict to Hamas’ ideology 
and aimed to generate public support for counterterrorism.  
 
(ii) Delegitimization: Hamas’ double war crime 
Delegitimization frequently (IDF 15%; MFA 9%) referred to Hamas’ double war 
crime of involving “its own civilians” by using them as “human shields” (“#Hamas 
doesn’t seem to have any problem with using #Gaza’s civilian population as hu-
man shields. […]”; MFA_167 also e.g. IDF_445), while at the same time firing at 
Israeli civilians. This practice has seen a revival in recent conflicts, by which the 
weaker party has often sought to gain an advantage over the militarily superior en-
emy. It presents an infringement to humanitarian law (Law of Armed Conflict, 
LOAC) and is one reason why Hamas is categorized as a terror organization 
(Goodman, 2014). By emphasizing that even Palestinian civilians suffer under 
Hamas, Hasbara actors responded to widespread sympathy for suffering Palestini-
ans (Mor, 2009, p.237), while maximizing Hamas’ responsibility: 
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“All we had to do was to show Hamas’ actions. (...) It is a fact that more Palestinians were 
killed by Palestinians than by Israelis during the years of the conflict. The famous image 
was the number of people who were executed by Hamas and then dragged on the street be-
hind motorcycles. This is Hamas. We just had to present that this is our enemy. They stand 
against each and every value of the rest of the world” (YM_399f). 
 
Hasbara authorities emphasized that while Hamas accept casualties or even un-
derstand them as a part of its belligerence, Israel does everything to avoid them, 
which conforms Mor’s finding (2009, p.237) of ‘moral differentiation’ (delegitimi-
zation combined with justification) as a major narrative. However, the continua-
tion of own attacks, despite the evident knowledge on intermingled civilians, un-
dermines their own recurring argument. This contradiction – which became evi-
dent during the attack on a media outlet in Gaza7 – does not only create new self-
triggered image predicaments, in which non-dispositional attribution (“we did not 
foresee”) becomes non-credible, it more fundamentally questions Israel’s charac-
ter-credibility. It triggers the perception that it is immoral for Hamas to use Hu-
man Shields but likewise immoral for Israel to bomb Human Shields (see Good-
man, 2014), which debilitates moral differentiation and again fails to respond to 
the international indignation about civilian victims of Israel’s military actions. 
 
(iii) Reframing: Objectification 
In order to avoid criticism for disproportionate use of force and minimize the out-
come negativity, the IDF’s actions were mostly presented as aimed at the technical 
infrastructure that facilitates execution of terroristic acts (IDF: 15%; MFA: 9%). In 
combination with denominating the Iron Dome – a truck-towed mobile air defense 
system, which counters short-range missiles and rockets which pose a threat to ci-
vilian population – as an important ‘actor’ (assigning responsibility), Israel’s bel-
ligerence was objectified. The impression of proportionality was created by pre-
senting the undeniable technological edge as military competence of precise target-
ing and the capability to avoid casualties or demolition, which challenged the nega-
tivity of the action.  
 
(iv) (Offensive) Reframing: Use of Fajr-5 rockets  
While the use of both justification and delegitimizing tactic resulted in moral dif-
ferentiation, the IDF also contrasted the Israeli military knowledge – employed to 
destroy rockets at Israel and protect citizens – with Hamas military capacity to 
reach and endanger several millions of civilians with Fajr-5 missiles8 (“Fajr-
5,Iranian-made rocket in Hamas’ hands, has a range that threatens over 3.5M 
                                                 
7 On November 18, 2012, the Israeli air force struck a media building, hosting Hamas TV in which 
four Jihad militants were said to be hiding (Kalman, Nov. 19, 2012). However, also several local and 
foreign correspondents were in the building (ibid.), considered as civilian targets according to the 
Geneva Convention. At least nine journalists were injured. 
8 The Fajr-5 is an Iranian made 333mm mobile multiple rocket launcher system, which reportedly 
has a range of 75 kilometers and can fire one rocket every four or eight seconds (see 
http://www.armyrecognition.com/iran_iranian_army_artillery_vehicles_systems_uk/fadjr-
5_fajr-5_333mm_multiple_rocket_launcher_system_technical_data_sheet_specifications.html 
from December 22, 2011). 
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Israelis […] #PillarOfDefense” IDF_404; i.e. also IDF_295). This tactic combina-
tion as ‘technological differentiation’ illustrates that (a) Hamas are not defenseless 
and Israel’s military superiority is overestimated (b) that Hamas exploited their 
military capacity in order to harm civilians. This narrative could be seen as one 
strategy to counterbalance the “asymmetric advantage born of psychological im-
punity” (Kedar & Mansdorf, 2008, p.38) which Hamas enjoys according to many 
Israeli officials.  
 
(v) (Offensive) Reframing: Israel under fire  
Reframing in order to illustrate “why Israel was forced into this operation” 
(YM_376) was according to Yoram Morad a core message during Pillar of Defense, 
which was prepared at the Hasbara Forum in the days before the operation. The 
first tweet answered this question, conveying that the IDF only reacted to – as 
typed “in bigger letters: ‘130 rockets in 72 hours’” (YM_362). It created a back-
ground against which force could be perceived as necessary, challenging its nega-
tivity. Presenting a reactive context of “defense” or “punishment” instead of a pro-
active context of “preemption” or “initiation” made retaliation appear less objec-
tionable. By describing the ongoing rocket threat (e.g. IDF_419, IDF_552) as well 
as constantly updating on Hamas’ rockets during PoD (“Over 420 rockets fired 
from the #Gaza Strip hit southern #Israel in the past two days”; IDF_378; also 
IDF_403), the operation was presented as indispensable for self-defense.  
“The second [message] put emphasis on the people around Gaza and also Ashdod 
and Beer-Sheva – but we focused on the struggle of people” (YM_377f). This offen-
sive reframing maximized the negativity of the outcome by presenting the life of 
Israelis (“Harmless rockets? Staggering number of kids in southern #Israel have 
PTSD […] #Gaza”, IDF_492, also IDF_392). 
 
(vi) Justification: The right to self-defense 
Within this offensively reframed situation, justification of own actions could be-
come meaningful. SD saw the “biggest message” (SD_89) in giving the IDF further 
legitimization. This materialized in the recurring question “what would you do if 
your country was attacked?” Officials neither challenged the responsibility for ac-
tion, nor the outcomes but invoked the universally accepted norm of a right to self-
defense (e.g. MFA_33). Military actions thus were presented as the last option. 
The more humanitarian message –  
 
“Look, we don’t want to be here, we don’t want to be in this conflict, we want to get it over 
as quickly as we possibly can, we are left with no choice and we do what we possibly can to 
avoid civilians” (PH_YM_419f) –  
 
was targeted at people in Gaza, the wider Arab world and the West. It was particu-
larly conveyed by the MFA (ibid.; also MFA_32).  
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Strategies and tactics in image-enhancing situations 
 
The quantitative analysis shows that Hasbara actors realized the value of promot-
ing positive policies and communicate in image-enhancing situations. They mostly 
used the credit gain strategy (19%) in form of entitling (17%), in order to increase 
the positivity of own actions and /or outcomes. Credit denial strategies were not 
detected since Hamas did not give reason to relate positive action/ outcome to 
them.  
 
(vii) Entitlements: Destruction of terror infrastructure 
A large portion of image-enhancing predicaments was only generated by (offen-
sive) reframing (22.1%), by creating threat situations in which military use would 
not only be accepted but perceived as success (“This morning, the IDF targeted 
#Hamas operatives in their hiding place in #Gaza where they were building 
rockets. Direct hit was confirmed”, IDF_597; “Today the IDF also targeted a 
number of #Hamas &amp (sic!); Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist squads that 
were coordinating attacks against #Israel”, IDF_611). Updates on intercepted 
rockets as well as precisely targeted terror sites took a big share of the tweets, 
mainly sent by the IDF. Messages on military success were according to Paul 
Hirschson targeted at (a) the Israeli audience in order to raise the moral 
(PH_YM_411f) and (b) to the Arab world as an intimidation to show that “we are 
big and ugly and nasty and you better be careful” (PH_YM_423) and “see, we can 
get you!” (PH_YM_430).  
However, credit gain never referred to successful policies but to military compe-
tence which could intensify a militarized image: the inability to shape messages 
directed to the own constituency and to global audiences with different values at 
the same time is evident here.  
 
(viii)  Enhancements /Entitlements: Responsibility for humanitarian aid 
Especially directed at the Western publics, diaspora and the wider Arab world, 
Hasbara actors emphasized the responsibility for humanitarian actions, such as 
aid deliveries or supply of medical treatment (PH_YM_419) (“Flow of humanitar-
ian aid into #Gaza goes unhindered, so as to not to harm necessary civilian life-
lines. #IsraelUnderFire #PillarOfDefense”, MFA_35; see also MFA_195). 
It aimed at showing the IDF’s “human face” (SD_95). The positivity of own actions 
was maximized by emphasizing the difficulty of ensuring humanitarian aid despite 
the counter-efforts of Hamas (enhancements). 
As during former peace processes, diplomatic efforts on a political level were not 
communicated. Real-political developments were rather in a mismatch with com-
municated events: while Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi met with U.S. Sec-
retary of State Hillary Clinton and Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal, but not with Is-
raeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or any Israeli official (Gollom, 2012), 
the Hasbara authorities emphasized their responsibility for the final agreement 
(implicit entitling: “After 8 days, the IDF has accomplished its goals in Operation 
Pillar of Defense. A cease-fire agreement has come into effect”; IDF_616). Negoti-
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ations were only marginally mentioned, especially compared to the military up-
dates, so that the ceasefire appeared sudden and without transparent genesis. Isra-
el – due to a lack of diplomatic efforts – did not appear as a driving force for peace, 
which undermines its self-perception of a “peace loving” society (Pinson, Levy & 
Soker, 2010, p.258).  
 
Self-validation strategies 
 
The importance of perceived character-credibility and the use of crediting strate-
gies (SQ 3) were not only reflected by the quantitative use (77%: at least one tactic; 
12%: two tactics). It was also shown in the expert interviews:  
 
“all we have is our reputation. We want people to gather the information from us and to be-
lieve it and to know that there are good chances that what we are telling them is true” 
(YM_105f).  
 
Unexpectedly, the Hasbara authorities focused on crediting own statements (MFA: 
87%; IDF: 90%) rather than discrediting the adversary (MFA: 11%; IDF: 8%). Vali-
dation is perceived as more relevant as technical affordances foster and demand 
transparency: 
 
“The fact that people can challenge your story very easily with facts they can get from our 
sources, it also changes the game of advocacy. (...) we know that we have to be reliable. We 
have to talk with facts or about issues we can proof” (YM_101f). 
 
Representatives of both IDF and MFA stressed that the exposure of “Hamas’ lies” 
would provide an argument to present its moral character (YM_393; SD_222) and 
explained the use of discrediting strategies. 
 
(i)  New factual material: Updates on rockets 
Especially the IDF’s tweets showed an apparently factual character, with updates 
on rocket numbers or background facts about the constant threat Israel is facing 
(IDF 37%; by the MFA 8%). While factual material generally indirectly credits 
blame avoidance or blame imposition tactics (Mor, 2012, p.409), it here supports 
the offensive reframing strategy “Israel under Fire” by creating threat situations. It 
was mostly accompanied with physical evidence (IDF: 18%; MFA: 16%) in form of 
aerial pictures, videos from the street, leaflets, audio files and more. 
 
(ii) Reliability of evidence: Stressing sovereignty of information 
Since factual claims and physical evidences leave room for interpretation, actors 
additionally have to persuade their audience of their interpretation through i.e. in-
direct argumentation of reliability of evidence (Mor, 2012, p.409f). By stressing its 
information monopoly which comes with first hand access to information through 
on-ground involvement, the IDF in particular emphasized the trustworthiness of 
collected evidence (IDF: 18%; MFA: 2%). Proactively sharing paid into Israel’s 
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character credibility, reflecting its sincerity to cooperate with the media represent-
atives on the ground. This credibility could be upheld by deliberately adhering to 
short-comings, such as proactive correction of statements (IDF_326; IDF_466) or 
technical problems, which hindered stringent communication (IDF_372) (see Mor, 
2012, p.419). Distributing exclusive information was also perceived as a mean to 
gain and keep public attention:  
 
“If you want people to follow you and to continue to follow you – not just for one time – 
you need to give them something that they do not have on another platform” (SD_83f.). 
 
(iii)  Reliability of interpretation: Similarity to global publics  
The MFA predominantly referred to trustworthy third parties, as well as to indi-
viduals as witnesses which can theoretically support reliability of interpretation 
(Mor, 2012, p.409) 
 
Firstly, they directly referred to public support of influential and stakeholders co-
deciding on public image, such as media, foreign politicians and NGOs (Dormann 
& Kiesendahl, 2006, p.178) (MFA: 40%, IDF: 6%). Tweets like “EU foreign rela-
tions chief blames #Hamas for starting conflict […] #IsraelUnderFire #Pil-
larOfDefense #IstandwithIsrael” (MFA_104) or “PM Netanyahu spoke with US 
Pres. Obama &amp (sic!); expressed appreciation for Obama’s support of Israel’s 
right to defend itself. #PillarOfDefence” (MFA_20) not only exposed Israel’s soft 
ties but also global support for its version of the story.  
 
Secondly, the MFA indirectly referred to common global norms to expose political 
and cultural proximity since individuals, journalists and organizations are more 
open to and interested in explanations of senders whose worldview is similar to 
theirs, and are more likely to understand and accept them (Sheafer & Shenhav, 
2009). Notably the shared democratic principles with Western countries – which 
differentiate Israel from the Gaza government – were communicated to increase 
acceptance (“RT @IsraelinUSA: Israel, a functioning #democracy //Pro-Gaza 
rally in Jerusalem interrupted by rocket sirens […]”; MFA_243).  
 
Thirdly, personalization as a sub-form of argumentation of reliability of interpreta-
tion (MFA: 15%; IDF: 10%) was found as a MFA-specific validation tactic. Digital 
media facilitates this form of story-telling which – as a complement to pure fact-
sharing – also potentially increases credibility (Wehmeier & Winkler, 2012, 
p.388). The intention behind personalization was to design “(...) a message that 
everyone can understand. It has to be a message that you can see yourself instead 
Israeli people” (SD_24; see also YM_87). Bloggers were hired to present a “real 
format. Then they look like not professional” (SD_227f.; i.e. MFA_218; 
MFA_226).  
 
(iv) Directly discrediting: Hamas’ unbelievable claims 
Although discrediting strategies were used less than expected, they were reliably 
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detectable. Especially direct charges of non-credibility easily were identified which 
confirms the validity of the used framework: “Exposing the #lie: The so-called ‘In-
jured Palestinian child’ is in fact an Israeli one, injured by Hamas’ rockets. #Ga-
za” (MFA_149, also: IDF_450, IDF_405) 
 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
 
This study mapped and contextualized the performance of DD by comprehensively 
analyzing strategies of image projection that Israel employs on digital media, as 
well as by presenting motivation for and reservations towards DD. Israel’s Twitter 
communication during the Operation Pillar of Defense served as case study. Expert 
interviews showed that DD was perceived as “one part of the whole project, the 
whole operation campaign” (YM_452). The expected benefits (conveying an alter-
native story, directly reaching crucial publics) lead to an acquiescence of loss of 
control. It seems that the more state actors are confronted with a negative public 
image, the more the willingness to accept risks increases.  
 
Mor’s self-presentation framework proved valuable to analyze this context as well 
as the generally abridged Twitter communication, which underpins the centrality 
of self-presentation as central in PD/DD. Generic self-presentation strategies and 
tactics, illustrated with typical statements, were specified for Israeli DD (Table 2) 
as those self-presentation arguments recurring almost like mantras on Twitter. 
While both MFA and IDF likewise recognized the intersection between new media, 
traditional media and the operation on the ground as crucial, their approach to-
wards DD varies: the MFA’s prime communication goal seems to be proactive 
long-term image broadening beyond the conflict, to mitigate arising image predic-
aments. The IDF on the other hand, primarily considers Twitter as a tool to re-
spond to predicaments in order to maintain credibility, as well as to legitimize 
IDF’s actions. Validation strategies also differ: the MFA aims to create credibility 
by pointing at support by influential third parties, indirectly pointing out cultural 
proximity with Western countries, and through personalization. The IDF refers to 
its information monopoly, presents proactively and timely first-hand information, 
presenting factual proofs such as pictures and numbers. 
 
Looking at self-presentation strategies, responsibility for actions was hardly chal-
lenged but competence for the use of force was mostly assigned to the IDF as the 
military organ. In order to avoid criticism for disproportionate use of force, bellig-
erence was objectified: military actions were presented as aimed at infrastructure 
that facilitates terroristic acts (minimizing negativity of action); the Iron Dome was 
presented as ‘actor’ (assigning responsibility) that prevents rocket victims in Israel. 
Considering other-presentation strategies, responsibility was associated with Ha-
mas/terrorist groups or to “Gaza” as a ‘quasi-actor’ in order to raise support for 
counterterrorism. Palestinians were not portrayed as actors but victims of those 
terroristic groups (human shields). The content analysis contradicts thus 
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Aouragh’s (2016) definition of Hasbara, as being predominantly “based on a me-
ticulously engineered stigmatization of Palestinians” (p.279).  
 
Recurring patters were ‘moral differentiation’ – delegimitazion of the other, com-
bined with justification of self – as well as ‘technical differentiation’. The latter 
gives an alternative interpretation to Israel’s capacity for the use of force: while the 
opponent allegedly sees casualties as part of war strategy (maximize negativity of 
military action), Israel’s technological edge is presented as military competence of 
precise targeting and the capability to avoid casualties or demolition (minimize 
negativity of military action).  
 
While the analysis showed that Israel in fact shifted from defensive to proactive 
self-presentation, some findings reveal problematic aspects. Firstly, although the 
Hasbara authorities applied soft power instruments, they still relied on hard-
power messages: offensive reframing tactics created threat scenarios, delegitimiza-
tion deepened in-group and out-group thinking – which implies that a diplomatic 
solution is moving beyond reach – and credit gain was linked to military successes 
of counterterrorist operations. The presented inevitability of military means for 
“self-defense” further militarizes Israel’s security thinking. Twitter communication 
again showed no political outlook on the situation. Opportunities for international 
credit gain through the presentation of peace-oriented policies were missed as well 
as the opportunity to respond to the home-publics self-perception as a peace-
loving country.  
 
Further, Twitter as a platform should not be used ruthlessly: it forces its users to 
curtail issues to 140 characters, to trivialize complex issues. The presentation of 
casualties is controversial anyway and, especially as Twitter does not allow contex-
tualization, tends to be condemned – especially by Western countries – due to the 
presented naturalism of war (Campell, 2004, p.65). This could lead to new image 
predicaments. While PD and DD’s relevance is recognized, the anticipation of pre-
dicaments or other communication effects is not yet a criterion for military deci-
sion-making (YM_438f), and shows the structural limitations for self-presentation 
embedded in a grand-strategy. 
 
The presented approach to study Twitter has some clear merits – such as theory 
testing and quantitatively proving the centrality of self-presentation in conflict 
communication. It is, however, not without limitations. Analyzing the interplay of 
more than one player could give insight into the dynamics of self-presentation as a 
strategic process. Analysis of further digital tools could complement the picture of 
Israeli DD. Most importantly, DD’s effectiveness, i.e. the transformation of image 
perception/ attitudes/ behavior in foreign publics, to ultimately impact on policy 
decision by foreign countries, warrants further examination. Considering the final 
goal of grand strategy as “winning peace” and assuming that “to a large extent, the 
character, duration, and outcomes of human conflicts are determined by rivaling 
parties’ frames of reference and discourses about peace and war” (Pinson et al., 
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2010, p.255), self-presentation can serve to prevent and de-escalate conflicts. The 
many-to-many online communication opens opportunities to engage people in 
peace-making efforts. At the same time, impact of unmediated DD can also be de-
structive when hate speech messages go viral and fuel violence. This shows that 
digital media brings responsibility for political actors to set the agenda for discus-
sion along ethical lines to prevent escalations.  
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